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We report the results of an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making under
uncertainty.  We used a large sample of economically literate undergraduate and postgraduate
students from the London School of Economics to play a simple monetary policy game, both as
individuals and in committees of five players.  Our findings – that groups make better decisions
than individuals – accord with previous work by Blinder and Morgan.  We also attempt to establish
why group decision-making is superior.  Our results show that some of the benefit is related to the
ability of committees to strip out the effect of bad play in any given period.  But there is a significant
additional improvement, which we associate with the ability of committee members to share
information and learn from each other by observing other members’ interest rate responses.  One
surprising result is that the superiority of committee decision-making does not appear to be related
to the ability to discuss the interest rate decision.
On 6 May 1997, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England was established and
granted operational independence in setting short-term interest rates to achieve the government’s
inflation target of 2.5%.  This new framework replaced the previous system of a single individual –
the Chancellor of the Exchequer – deciding on the appropriate level of UK base rates.
Why delegate monetary policy to a committee?  The academic argument for central bank
independence is well established (see, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983)).  And in practice,
there is strong evidence from across the world to suggest that committees are the preferred
arrangement for setting monetary policy by central banks.  For instance, a wide-ranging survey
undertaken by Fry, Julius, Roger, Mahadeva and Sterne (1999) finds that 79 central banks out of a
sample of 88 use some form of committee structure when setting monetary policy.  By weight of
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numbers, it appears to be accepted that setting interest rates by committee is superior.  And the
intuitive argument that committees make better decisions than individuals – because they allow
decision-makers to pool judgement – also seems plausible.
With the exception of Gerlach-Kristen (2001), the theoretical economics literature has less to say
about the consequences of delegating responsibility to a committee. The hypothesis that groups make
better monetary policy decisions is difficult to test, due to a lack of comparable empirical data.  This
problem motivated Blinder and Morgan (2000) to adopt a different approach: carrying out a
‘laboratory experiment’ on a large sample of Princeton University students to test whether groups do
indeed make monetary policy decisions differently.
In an experiment, the researcher can isolate the relative performance of individual and group
behaviour, controlling for differences in the abilities, incentives and preferences of the decision-
makers, and of the environment in which they work.  The main drawback is that it is artificial – it is
not possible to replicate exactly the complexities of real world policy making in the context of a
simple experiment.
Although experimental techniques are relatively new to monetary economics, they are well
established in other branches of economics such as asset pricing, game theory and decision making
under uncertainty.
(3)  In addition, psychologists have studied group behaviour for many years, and a
series of experiments – for example, Hall (1971), Janis (1972) and Myers (1982) - have shown that
group decisions are rarely equal to the sum of their parts.  Group performance depends on the nature
of the interaction between members and the task in hand, but the consensus view seems to be that for
complex tasks, decisions taken by committee should be at least as good as the average of the
individuals that comprise it.
This hypothesis was supported by the results of Blinder and Morgan (2000).  In their experiment,
groups made substantially better decisions on average than individuals.  And, just as in real life, there
were also disagreements between committee members over interest-rate decisions.  But, contrary to
their expectations, groups did not make decisions more slowly than individuals.
Examining whether groups make better decisions than individuals is the main focus of this paper.  It
describes a new experiment with students from the London School of Economics, which explored in
more detail why groups are superior.  One explanation is that majority voting helps to eliminate the
poor decisions of a minority of members.  But this experiment provided evidence that committees do
more than just this, allowing members to pool information and learn more about the game they are
playing.
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The experiment also explicitly tested whether the ability to exchange information through discussion
improved performance. Such a finding would not be surprising if players held different prior views
about the nature of the (unknown) model of the economy.  So the experiment tried to examine such
differences of opinion by means of a questionnaire designed to help establish the beliefs of players
about the economy.
Section 1 describes the economic model used and the structure of the experiment; section 2 discusses
the results; section 3 analyses them using a panel data framework; and in section 4 we conclude by
trying to draw some inferences from our work for the design of monetary frameworks in the real
world.
1.  The experiment
(i)  The model
We asked participants to act as monetary policy makers by attempting to ‘control’ a simple
macroeconomic model subject to shocks.  We used a standard small-scale macro model of the type
widely used for policy analysis in modern macroeconomics (see for example, Fuhrer and Moore
(1995)).  Where possible, it is calibrated to match UK macroeconomic data (see Bank of England
(1999, 2001)) and is shown in equations (1) and (2) below:
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Where yt is log output, y* is the natural rate of output,
(4) t is inflation, Rt is the nominal interest rate
and r* is the neutral real interest rate (calibrated to 3% per annum).  g is a permanent shock, t and t
are shocks corresponding to a random draw from a normal distribution ~ N(0, ) in each period.
Equation (1) is an ‘IS curve’.  The current output gap (yt - y*) is a function of its one-period lag, and
the deviation of the real interest rate from its neutral level in the current period (Rt - t - r*).  The IS
curve is also subject to two types of shock.  The first, g , is a permanent shock which occurs at
random, and with equal likelihood, during one of the first five periods in each round; and the second
– t – is white noise.
The structural shock  g  takes the value +/- 0.5.  It can be though of as a permanent change in the
equilibrium real interest rate.  This type of shock is attractive because it does not affect the inflation-
output trade-off, and therefore the ability of the score function outlined in equation (4) below to
adequately capture participants’ performance.
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Equation (2) is a ‘Phillips Curve’.  Inflation is a function of lagged values of itself and the current
output gap.  The coefficients on lagged inflation sum to one, implying that although a short-run
trade-off between output and inflation exists, the Phillips curve is vertical in the long run.  The shock
t is white noise.
The monetary authority’s decision rule for the short-term interest rate – as decided by the
participants of the experiment – closes the model.  It is possible to calculate the optimal rule under
full information.
(5)  This is approximated by:
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In a backward-looking model of the type described in equations (1) and (2) above, optimal policy
under partial information is the same as its full-information counterpart (see the introduction of
Svensson and Woodford (2000)).
(6)  So the performance of this ‘optimal rule’ provides a useful
benchmark against which to compare individual and group results.  And we can attempt to assess
whether the behaviour of players approaches this rule over time.
(ii)  Priors
An intriguing feature of Blinder and Morgan’s (2000) results was that committee members
frequently disagreed about their decisions, despite having identical loss functions and the same
information set.  But even without observing such differences in voting – whether experimentally, or
in real life – it seems entirely plausible that committee members can think differently about how to
respond to shocks that are only indirectly observed via the response of the endogenous variables in
their model.  And this should be especially true of a committee where members have diverse
backgrounds and specialities.
We posit that the differences of opinion observed in the Blinder and Morgan experiment reflected
different subjective judgements about the structure of the model.  So at the beginning of our
experiment, players filled in a questionnaire that attempted to reveal their prior knowledge of the
economy.
(7)  A set of ‘correct’ answers to this ‘priors’ questionnaire’ would yield the parameters of
the model in question and therefore the structure of the optimal rule.
During the experiment, players should learn about the structure of the economy – just like real world
policy-makers – by observing the response of inflation and output to changes in interest rates,
updating their priors, and changing their perception of the ‘correct’ model accordingly.  We
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attempted to capture this learning by asking participants to fill in the same questionnaire again at the
end of the experiment.
(iii)  Information flows and incentives for players
To make the decision-problem of the players as similar to that of real-life policy-makers within the
confines of a simple experiment, we also control carefully for their incentives and the information
they receive.
Players received a clear mandate at the beginning of the experiment:
(8) their objective was to
maximise a ‘score’ function which penalised deviations of output and inflation from their target
values of 5 and 2.5% respectively:
5 . 2 ) ( 40 5 ) ( 40 100 ) (      t Inflation t Output t Score (4)
As in Blinder and Morgan (2000), we chose a linear rather than quadratic loss function so that
players could easily translate their (average) score into a final payoff.  And at the end of the game,
the participants were paid in pounds according to the following (known) formula:
Payoff = 10 + Average Score/10 (5)
Where the maximum payoff was £20 for a perfect score, and was bounded from below at £10.  In
practice, students earned around £15-£16.  We also offered top prizes of £100 for the best individual
score the best committee.
(9)
Just like actual policy-makers, participants in our experiment made decisions in an uncertain world,
while observing only the evolution of the endogenous variables over time. Participants did not know
with certainty the exact structure of the economy, but they were told that the representative model
was linear, learnable and broadly characterised the structure of the UK economy.
There was also uncertainty about the nature of the shocks hitting the economy.  Players were
informed that:
‘…a structural change occurs at some point during each game.  The key to playing successfully is to
identify when the change has occurred and how best to respond to it’
And they were told that the economy was subject to other shocks in each period. This differs from
Blinder and Morgan (2000), where subjects were told the probability laws governing the occurrence
______________________________________________________________________________
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of the structural shock.  We believe that our specification makes game play more typical of real-
world policy making, where central bankers are unlikely to face shocks with a known distribution or
size. The relative sizes of the three shocks were calibrated after testing the model on subjects within
the Bank.
Some manipulation of equation (3) shows that a positive  g  shock corresponds to a 1% increase in
the neutral real interest rate to 4%, and vice versa for a negative shock.  So, for example, if players
do not react to an upward shift in r*, they risk accelerating inflation; and the model can quickly
become unstable because of the unit root in inflation built into the Phillips curve.  Players must
therefore extract the signal from the noise and change their behaviour accordingly in order to
maximise their score.
(iv)  Outline of the experiment
To analyse the effect of individual versus committee decision-making discussed above, we structured
the experiment so that participants played the game under a number of different decision-making
structures.  The sequencing of the experiment can be summarised as follows:
Table A
The structure of the monetary policy experiment
Read instructions sheet
Fill in ‘Priors Questionnaire’
Practice rounds No score recorded
Stage 1 (rounds 1-4) Played as individuals
Stage 2 (rounds 5-8) Played as a group (i): No discussion
(ii): With discussion
Stage 3 (rounds 9-12) Played as a group (i): With discussion
(ii): No discussion
Stage 4 (rounds 13-16) Played as individuals
Fill in ‘Priors Questionnaire’
Students are paid according to their average score across the four stages
After entering the laboratory, participants were allocated into groups of five.  They were given a
standard, short, oral briefing and were asked to read a set of instructions.  Each player was asked to
fill in the ‘priors’ questionnaire’ as a way of gauging his or her prior beliefs about the model.  They
were given about ten minutes to practise on their own with the actual version of the game used in the
experiment before starting to play ‘for real’.
                                                                                                                                                                   
(9) These ‘bonus’ payments were instigated in order to try to ensure that players had an incentive not to exchange7
The experiment itself comprised four stages.  Each stage consisted of four rounds, with each round
containing ten periods of play in which participants had to decide on what interest rate to set in
response to combinations of unobserved shocks.  Players were scored according to equation (4), and
the overall score for each round was taken as the average across the ten periods.  It is these overall
scores that we use in the analysis of Section 2.
In the first stage, the participants acted as individual policy makers, playing separate games on
separate computers for four rounds.  Beginning with round 1, the game started in period t = 1 with
inflation and output near the steady-state equilibrium (y = 5, = 2.5).
(10)  In each round, inflation and
output were observed with a one-period lag, so after viewing the level of output and inflation in
period t = 0, players decided on the appropriate level of the interest rate for period 1 and entered this
into the computer.  The game then proceeded to the next period (t = 2).  The computer displayed
output and inflation outturns for period 1, along with the score for that round and the interest rate
decision.  The same decision problem was repeated until the game reached t = 10.  At this point,
players were told their average score for round 1, the game was reset, and play continued, being
repeated for a further three rounds.
In stage 2 – beginning in round 5 – the group acted as a committee with each member entering his or
her own vote on their computer as before.  But this time, in each period, the computer selected, and
then set, the median vote for the group – as a proxy for a majority-voting rule – and participants
observed this committee decision, as well as the response of output and inflation.  They also saw the
(unattributed) votes of their fellow committee members and overall score for the period and the
round so far.  Again each round lasted for ten periods.  Stage 2 finished in round 8.
The committee phase was played in two stages – stage 2 and 3 in Table A above – each of which
corresponded to a distinct scenario.  The order of these two stages was randomised across
committees in order to control for learning.  Under scenario (i), discussion among members of the
group was not allowed in stage 2.  The five players observed the same information in each period –
the level of output and inflation of the previous period(s) as well as the history of interest rates and
scores – and entered their votes while sitting at separate computers, without talking with fellow
players.  In scenario (ii), participants were allowed to discuss their decisions in stage 2, and again,
the computer would set the median interest rate of the group.
(11)  This discussion was not constrained
in any way, and in practice could take many forms.
                                                                                                                                                                   
information with future participants outside the laboratory.
(10) The first observation at time t = 0 would always be the steady state perturbed by a random shock to each equation of
the model.
(11) Participants were again asked to sit at their own computers to enter their votes: during testing we observed that if the
committee gathered around one computer this created a bias towards the decision of a chairperson who entered the votes.8
Stage 4 (rounds 13-16) served as another control, to ensure that the comparison between individual
and committee play was not biased by the fact that participants had had four (or more) individual
rounds to learn before entering the committee stage.  By returning to individual play at the end of the
experiment, it was possible to verify that the improvement in scores during the committee stages
(rounds 5-12) was not just an extension of the learning trend observed in rounds 1-4.
(12)
(v)  The data
The experiment was conducted on ten evenings between 12 November and 11 December 2001 at the
London School of Economics.  Participation in the experiment was voluntary, and the sample of
students was entirely independent from the Bank of England.  For the main experiment described
above, 170 students participated in 34 independent experiments,
(13) giving a
cross-section of 34 committees with 16 time series observations for each.  A further 15 students were
used to play an alternative version of the experiment described in Section 2(iii) below. All
participating students had taken at least one undergraduate-level economics course.
2.  Results
The main focus of the experiment was to provide evidence on the differences between group and
individual policy making; and this is discussed in Section (ii) below.  But because the nature of the
experiment is one of decision-making under uncertainty with learning, we begin by discussing what
we ‘learned about learning’ in Section (i).  Section (iii) deals with the difference between discussion
and no discussion committee scenarios.
(i)  Learning
This section is divided into two parts: evidence on learning about the structure of the model, and then
on learning how to play the game.  The two are inextricably linked.
(i.i) Priors
Players’ answers to the ‘priors questionnaire’ give some insight into their initial beliefs about the
structure of the economy.  As noted in Section 1(ii), a set of ‘correct’ answers will reveal the key
features of the model and the associated optimal rule. Participants also filled in the same
questionnaire again at the end of the experiment; and from this we can judge whether their beliefs
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converged on the actual parameters of the underlying model.  One test of learning is the extent of
convergence over the course of the game.
All answers to the questionnaire are in numeric form, allowing the calculation of the mean square
error (MSE) of responses across questions.  Overall, this statistic decreased from 0.17 in the initial
questionnaire, to 0.15 at the end of the experiment, and this is significant (t = 3.4).  The standard
deviation of responses to the questionnaire also narrowed significantly from 1.59 to 1.45 (t = 3.5).
We can decompose this improvement further by computing the change in MSE for individual
questions between the initial and final questionaires. We find that participants learnt most about the
lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Q2) and the weight they should attach to
deviations of output from trend in their ‘rule’ (Q3). There was a significant decline in the MSE of
their responses to both questions. Participants did less well at working out the appropriate degree of
interest rate smoothing and the parameters of the model (Q1) and (Q4-8) respectively. Especially the
long-run neutrality property of the model (Q8) and the impact of interest rate changes on output. The
experiment may have been too short to learn much about these aspects.
(i.ii) Playing the game
The results of the priors’ questionnaire provide tentative evidence of learning about certain aspects of
the model and the nature of the optimal rule, but did players actually get better at playing the game
over time?
The solid line in chart 1 shows the mean scores attained by the 34 committees over time.
 This is
broken down into the first set of individual play (rounds 1-4), committee play (rounds 5-12) and then
individual play for a second time (rounds 13-16).  For the individual rounds, the ‘committee’ score is
taken to be the mean of the scores across the five individuals playing separately.  For the committee
rounds, this statistic is the mean score that each committee decision attracts.
There are three striking features of the data:
(1) The significant upward trend in the results over time;
(2) the large rise in scores when players moved to committee decision-making in Game 5;  and
(3) the large downward move in scores when participants returned to playing as individuals in Game
13.10

























Individuals’ scores were higher in round 16 than in round 1, rising from a group average of 23 to 53.
This increase is extremely significant (t = 5.12), providing evidence of a significant learning effect
during the game.
Within the individual rounds, there was strong evidence of learning.  The average of the scores
across each group was twelve points higher in round 4 than in round 1 and was eight points higher in
round 16 than round 13.  Both difference in mean tests are significant at the 1% level for a one-tailed
test.  These results suggest that learning occurred during the game, regardless of whether individuals
were allowed to exchange information with others.
If we rank the players in each committee by their initial performance we find – perhaps
unsurprisingly – that the worst players learnt most. This is consistent with the view that some players
begin the game with the completely wrong model in their head, and so their decisions attract a very
low score initially relative to others with more accurate priors.  As they learn that their priors do not
accord with the truth – through playing the game, and observing their scores – they update their
beliefs and their performance improves accordingly. There is for example a significant positive
correlation between the amount by which the worst players improve over the game, and their initial
errors about the model when answering the questionnaire.
On average, the best players in each committee improved their scores during the experiment.  This
suggests that the improvement over time was not merely the result of the worst players learning from
their better counterparts.  These findings contrast with Blinder and Morgan (2000) where there was
less evidence of learning.  One reason for this might be that our model is slightly simpler, for11
example, participants have to learn fewer parameters in our game: five as compared with seven in
Blinder and Morgan.
(ii)  Groups vs individuals
We found strong evidence that decisions taken by committees were superior to those of individuals.
The average score during the committee rounds was nearly two-thirds better (68 compared with 41),
and significantly higher (t = 7.4) than the average for the individual rounds.
We can also use the optimal rule under full information to calibrate the size of this improvement. The
average score from simulating the game under this optimal rule is 85, much higher than the best
individual player’s score (71), but only slightly better than the best committee (83).  On average,
moving from individual decision-making to a committee structure closed nearly
two-thirds of the ‘policy gap’.
How do we explain this improvement in committee performance?  There are (at least) two distinct,
competing hypotheses that can be used to explain why committee decisions are superior to those of
the individuals that comprise it.  We refer to these as Hypotheses 1 and 2:
Hypothesis 1: A committee with ‘majority’ voting can neutralise the impact of some members
playing badly in any given game.
Hypothesis 2: Committees allow members to improve performance by sharing information and
learning from each other.
We can use Chart 1 to give a visual representation of the contribution of these two hypotheses.  The
dashed line represents the average – over the 34 independent groups of five players – of the median
player’s score.  The solid line is simply the mean score across all players in each committee.
(14)  Line
C is the mean score over all the committee rounds and line D is the mean score over rounds 13-16 for
the median players in each of those rounds.  The overall improvement in performance – generated by
setting interest rates by committee – is therefore measured as the distance between C and A: the
difference between the average score in the final individual round and the committee rounds.
The chart decomposes this improvement into two distinct components.  The difference between the
score of the mean and median player in the individual rounds (represented by the distance
B-A in Chart 1) should be equal to the adverse effect of a minority of poor performers on the mean
individual score.  This is therefore the extent of improvement under Hypothesis 1 described above.
And this portion of the difference in means is significant (t = 3.7).  So we can not reject Hypothesis
1.
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(14) Again, note that the mean score in the committee rounds is the score of the committee’s interest rate decision.12
The contribution of Hypothesis 2 should be represented by the residual, C-B (the portion of the
committee improvement not explained by the move to majority voting).  This difference is also
significant (t = 2.8), so we cannot reject Hypothesis 2 either.
The significant decline in scores as participants move back to individual play is a striking feature of
both our results and those of Blinder and Morgan (2000).  By definition, this ‘residual’ component of
the committee improvement cannot be associated with learning about the game over time, because
the information set of the players must be at least as great in round 13 than it was before.  We argue
therefore that this residual effect stems from the ability of committees to pool judgement, expertise
and skill.  This is represented by the distance C-D in Chart 1 (12.9) and is also significant (t = 4.2).
In other words, there is ‘something special’ about committees beyond their ability to aid learning and
to strip out the effects of ‘bad’ players.
The mean committee score (68) was also higher than that of the best individual (65) in each
committee when playing alone (t = 1.51, significant at the 10% level). This provides further evidence
that committees do more than just replicate the behaviour of their best individual.
 (iii) Discussion vs. No Discussion
The experiment also included two different ways of organising committee decision-making: one
where participants were allowed to discuss their views and another where no verbal communication
was allowed.  Perhaps the most surprising result was that the ability to discuss did not significantly
improve committee performance.
This result was in contrast to earlier trials on Bank staff.   So, in addition to the main experiment
described above, a further small sample of students was asked to play a different version as a
robustness check.  This variant was designed so as to raise the implicit benefit of discussion:
committee members were told - with a lag of up to two periods - that a shock had occurred, and the
length of this information lag was allowed to vary across players.  The ability to discuss was
therefore more valuable because committee members with more timely information could share this
with others more quickly by verbal communication.  The average score for discussion was higher
than non-discussion committees in this version of the game, although the small sample size – three
committees – meant that the significance of this improvement could not be tested.
So our committees must have pooled information in other ways. The benefits of different forms of
communication are likely to depend on the nature of the game, as well as the individuals taking part.
There are many games – for example snooker or chess – that may be easier to learn by watching,
rather than discussion.  And it appears that for the main version of the game, and for this set of13
students, discussion did not provide more information than could be acquired by observing others’
votes.
There is also some evidence from the psychology literature that discussion may not always enhance
group performance.  The idea of ‘group polarisation’ – as proposed by Myers (1982) – suggests that
discussion tends to polarise any initial tendency within the group.  This is because people have an
innate desire to compare themselves favourably with each other, and so take increasingly extreme
positions in favour of the initial group proposition.  One way around this problem is to ensure that a
frank and open exchange of views takes place at the beginning of the discussion – as outlined in an
earlier study by Hall (1971) who showed that groups who established a common consensus quickly
were often less effective.
3.  A Panel Data Approach
Can we bring together the stylised facts described above in an econometric model? A panel-data
framework allows us to model the cross-sectional behaviour of committees over time as a function of
a group of common variables.  We use a ‘fixed effects’ approach.  This captures the unobservable
features of each committee – such as the innate ability of participants to play the game – within an
intercept term which is allowed to exhibit cross-sectional variation.
(15)
The 34 committees, each playing the game 16 times, group the data.  This gives a fully rectangular
panel of 544 observations.  The time series dimension divides naturally into three different stages:
the first set of individual rounds (numbered 1 to 4); the rounds played as a committee (5-12); and the
final set of individual rounds (13-16). The individual rounds generated five independent observations
for each period. For these, the ‘committee observation’ is taken to be the mean score of the five
players, allowing us to model the evolution of the average performance of committee members over
time. But this has implications for the structure of the matrix of regressors: for example, when we
consider how actively interest rates are changed, the variable enters the regression separately for
rounds played as individuals and rounds played by committee.  In the committee stages, the standard
deviation of the policy rate set by each committee in each game is included.  For the individual
games the mean of the standard deviations for the five individual players is used.
Estimation is by OLS, using a general-to-specific modelling strategy.  The results for four candidate
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(15) We reject the null hypothesis that the data should be modelled as a ‘random effects’ model (ie that there was no
correlation between the individual effects and the independent variables).  The Hausman test statistic is 
2 = 37.81,





it it i it u s t y          
          5 4 3
16 1





it it i it u s t t t y            











it it i it u s t t y           




2 2 2 1 1 ) ln( ) ln( (d)
Table B: Panel data estimation results
Coefficient on: Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d)
















































Time trend for rounds 5 to 12 (3) -3.82
(-0.94)




Log likelihood -2360.7 -2353.3 -2349.2 -2349.7
Akaike information criterion -2398.7 -2393.3 -2391.2 -2390.7
Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion -2412.7 -2408.0 -2406.6 -2405.7
R
2 0.3595 0.3743 0.3797 0.3795
For models (a) to (d) ‘i’ indexes committees i=1…34 and ‘t’ indexes the round number, t=1,…16.
So it y  is the score of committee ‘i’ in round t;  i is the constant for committee ‘i’ (the unobserved,
committee-specific, fixed effect); and the error uit is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed N(0,
2
u  ) and independent of the matrix of regressors.
To capture how the scores change over time we consider different time trends and dummy variables.
ln(t)
i-j is the time trend from round i to round j, 1 is a dummy variable – representing an intercept
shift – for the committee rounds (5 to 12) and 2 is for rounds 13 to 16.  In practice the best fit is15
achieved by fitting a separate logarithmic trend through the two sets of individual rounds
(16). The
regressor set consists of a range of variables that attempt to capture both the structure of the game




it  and 
C
it  are the standard deviation of the interest rates set across the ten
periods of each game played by individuals and committees respectively. A dummy variable for the
discussion committee rounds is not significant across all models, consistent with the result that the
ability to discuss does not have a significant effect on committee performance.
Model (d) is our preferred model. The coefficients on both dummy variables 1 and 2 are positive
and we reject the null hypothesis that 1 equals 2 in favour of the alternative that 1 is greater
(consistent with the evidence presented in Chart 3 of a positive, and significant, committee effect on
mean scores).  3 is positive and significant: the later in the game the structural change occurred, the
higher the score.  Because of the unit root built into the Phillips curve, a shock occurring early in the
game can lead to a substantial divergence in inflation and output from target, making the economy
more difficult to control over the remainder of the round; particularly if it takes some time for the
player to recognise that such a shock has occurred. Both 4 and 5 are negative: excessive interest
rate movements during the game are associated with lower scores for both individuals and
committees.
The panel data analysis reinforces the general conclusions from the rest of the paper: that committees
were significantly better than individuals, and players’ performance improves over time. But we also
find evidence that higher interest rate activism – as measured by the standard deviation of the interest
rate in each ten-period round – was associated with lower scores for both individuals and
committees.
When the model described by equations (1) and (2) was simulated under the optimal rule (3), interest
rate movements were, on average, significantly less activist than those of the individuals, but not the
committees, who played the game. Taken together with the results from the panel data analysis, one
interpretation might be that committees allow players to learn the appropriate amount of activism
more quickly by pooling information. Even if the causation were to run in the opposite direction –
that is to say that bad players need to vary interest rates more because the economy is further away
from target – it is still the case that good players can learn that this strategy is sub-optimal over time.
In other words, they can work out that aggressive movements in interest rates make the economy
more difficult to control, and players understand this property of the model more quickly by
exchanging information.
______________________________________________________________________________
(16) Using Akaike and Schwarz information criterion to select between models.
(17) Since players face shocks at different times when playing individually, this variable is only included for the games
played as a committee.16
4.  Conclusions
In this paper we have undertaken an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making by
individuals and committees.  Our experiment suggests overwhelmingly that committees performed
much better than the average of the individuals who compose them.  And there is also evidence to
suggest that committee performance was, on average, better than the performance of the best
individual.
We argue that, while some of the improvement associated with group play reflects the averaging of
errors across members, the ability of committees to allow the pooling of judgement and information
(in whatever form) means that a group can be more than just the sum of its parts.  And we present
evidence to support the view that this pooling function has a significant role to play in explaining
committee improvement.  Perhaps surprisingly, committees that were able to discuss their decisions
did not perform better than those who cannot.  Our hypothesis is that – for this particular version of
the game, and this set of students – participants were able to glean the same amount of information
about the game from observing each other’s play and therefore did not derive much extra benefit
from discussion.  In the real world, policy-making is undoubtedly a more complex affair, and the
exchange of information and ideas is likely to be crucial for optimal monetary policy setting.
It is also possible to observe some evidence of learning within the experiment.  The answers to the
priors’ questionnaire suggest that participants learnt a significant amount about certain aspects of the
model during the game.  And although only the worst two players in each committee demonstrated
significant learning over time, even the best players improved somewhat.  The econometric analysis
concurs with the conclusion that committees gave a significant boost to the performance of the
individuals that comprise them.  And it also suggests that one way in which committees were able to
do better in our experiment was by making less activist interest rate decisions over time.17
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Appendix 1:  Derivation and uses of the optimal rule for the monetary policy experiment
Assuming that players attempt to maximise their score (St) in each period of the game, the decision
problem can be written as:
 t t r S E Max
t
1       s.t.  (1)  t t t t g r y y       5 . 0 8 . 0 1   where   
2 , 0 ~    N t
(2)   t t t t t y           2 . 0 3 . 0 7 . 0 2 1  where   
2 , 0 ~    N t
where:  (3)   * 40 * 40 100        t t t y y S
Approximating (3) as a linear quadratic, we derive the optimal rule by substituting in the constraints
(1) and (2) and differentiating with respect to rt to give:
g y r t t t t 2 115 . 0 27 . 0 6 . 1 2 1 1          (4)
Obviously, the distribution of  g is unknown to participants in the experiment, so (4) is the ‘certainty
equivalence optimal rule’.  Svensson and Woodford (2000) note that – under the assumption that the
loss function is quadratic – the optimal policy rule under partial information is the same as its full-
information counterpart.  We use this optimal rule to conduct the simulations in Section 4(ii) and
also to calibrate the correct responses to the priors’ questionnaire.
Appendix 2:  Priors’ questionnaire
Players were asked to give numeric responses to the following questions.  They could choose any
value from α=0 to α=1, with intervals of 0.1, apart from question (2) where the options ranged from
0 to 10 periods.
1) To what extent should monetary policy makers respond cautiously to shocks (ie if their interest
rate reaction function includes the following expression  .... 1    t t i i  , what weight should they place
on )?
2) After how many quarters is the maximum impact of monetary policy on inflation felt?
3) What relative weight should monetary policy makers place on smoothing output compared with
controlling inflation (ie if their reaction function includes the following expression
.... *) )( 1 ( ) (           t t t Y y i , what weight should they place on α)?
4) To what extent are shocks to output persistent (ie if the expression for output included the
following term  .... 1    t t y y  , what weight do you think α would take)?19
5) How sensitive is output to changes in interest rates (ie if the expression for output included the
following term  ....   t t i y  , what weight do you think α would take)?
6) To what extent are shocks to inflation persistent (ie if the expression for inflation included the
following term  .... 1    t t   , what weight do you think α would take)?
7) To what extent is inflation sensitive to deviations of output from trend in the short run (ie if the
expression for inflation included the following term  .... ) ( 1     Y yt t   , what weight do you think
α would take)?
8) To what extent is inflation sensitive to deviations of output from trend in the long run? Not at all
sensitive (ie =0) or highly sensitive (ie =1)?